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Beyond Componential Constitution in 
the Brain
Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints
Michael L. Anderson
Componential mechanism (Craver 2008) is an increasingly influential framework
for understanding the norms of good explanation in neuroscience and beyond.
Componential mechanism “construes explanation as a matter of decomposing sys-
tems into their parts and showing how those parts are organized together in such
a way as to exhibit the explanandum phenomenon” (Craver 2008,  p. 109). Al-
though this clearly describes some instances of successful explanation, I argue
here that as currently formulated the framework is too narrow to capture the full
range of good mechanistic explanations in the neurosciences. The centerpiece of
this essay is a case study of Starburst Amacrine Cells—a type of motion-sensitive
cell in mammalian retina—for which function emerges from structure in a way that
appears to violate the conditions specified by componential mechanism as cur-
rently conceived. I argue that the case of Starburst Amacrine Cells should move
us to replace the notion of mechanistic componential constitution with a more
general notion of enabling constraint. Introducing enabling constraints as a con-
ceptual tool will allow us to capture and appropriately characterize a wider class
of structure-function relationships in the brain and elsewhere.
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1 Introduction
How, in  the brain  or  any other  system,  does
specific  function  arise  from  underlying  struc-
ture? The question is a general one, and also in
some sense a vague one, for it  asks simultan-
eously about how structures shape events—gen-
erate causes—and also about what kinds of ex-
planations one should aim for in neuroscience.
Here I will focus on the second question in the
hope of partially illuminating the first. One in-
creasingly  influential  class  of  answers  to  this
second  question  “construes  explanation  as  a
matter of decomposing systems into their parts
and showing how those parts are organized to-
gether in such a way as to exhibit the explanan-
dum  phenomenon”  (Craver 2008,  p.  109;  see
also Craver this collection). This is an attractive
idea as it is expressed, but what I hope to illus-
trate here is that the leading formalizations of
this  general  idea  (Craver 2008;  Craver &
Bechtel 2007) place overly restrictive conditions
on good mechanistic explanation. In what fol-
lows, I lay out the norms of mechanistic explan-
ation, as developed by Craver and Bechtel, and
describe some cases that their model nicely cap-
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tures.  I  then  introduce  the  case  of  Starburst
Amacrine Cells (SACs)—a type of motion-sens-
itive cell in mammalian retina. In SACs, and in
the functionally coupled direction-selective gan-
glion cells, the function-structure relationship is
hard  to  capture  within  the  Craver/Bechtel
mechanistic framework. I argue that we can bet-
ter capture such cases by replacing the notion of
mechanistic componential constitution with the
more general notion of enabling constraints.
2 The requirements of mechanistic 
explanation 
Craver (2008)  sharply  distinguishes  between
two traditions of  understanding scientific ex-
planation: reductive explanation and systems
explanation.  According  to  Craver,  the  first
tradition accepts a version of the covering law
model of explanation (Hempel 1965) whereby
one explains regularities at a given level of or-
ganization by showing how these  regularities
(the  laws  describing  events  and  their  rela-
tions) can be derived from theories holding at
lower  levels.  Put  differently,  one  explains  a
phenomenon of interest by showing how it is
to  be  expected based  on  the  laws  governing
activity at  lower  levels  of  organization.  This
tradition is  reductive because when such ex-
planations  are  successful,  one  can  strictly
speaking  do  without the  higher-level  laws.
However  convenient  they  may  be  for  under-
standing  or  predicting  higher-level  phenom-
ena, the higher-level laws do not add, capture,
or explain any facts that are not already con-
tained in the lower-level laws. The lower-level
laws are scientifically sufficient. 
In  contrast,  in  the  systems tradition,  a
phenomenon of interest  exhibited by a sysψ -
tem S is explained by identifying a set of com-
ponent parts {X} and showing how they are
organized such that S ψs. A systems explana-
tion is similar to reductive explanation in that
it too relies on the identification of levels of
organization,  since it  requires  identifying the
parts of the system S, but, as I note below, it
does not aim thereby at the reduction or ex-
planatory absorption of one level by another.
Craver & Bechtel write: 
In levels of mechanisms, an item X is at a
lower level than an item S if and only if X
is a component in the mechanism for some
activity  of  S.  X is  a  component in  aψ
mechanism if and only if it is one of the
entities or activities organized such that S
’s.  For  that  is  what  mechanisms  are:ψ
they are entities  and activities  organized
such that they exhibit a phenomenon. Sci-
entists discover lower levels by decompos-
ing the behavior of a mechanism into the
behaviors of its component parts, decom-
posing the behaviors of the parts into the
behaviors of their parts, and so on. (2007,
pp. 548–549)1
As already noted, S is the system that s, orψ
that exhibits phenomenon. It is, for instance,
the  car  (S)  that  accelerates  ( ),  and to  exψ -
plain car acceleration will  require  identifying
the components {X} that matter to  S -ing.ψ
To identify these components and their organ-
ization is to explicate the mechanism  M that
accounts for  S -ing. The target of mechanψ -
istic explanations of this sort is : “mechanψ -
istic explanations are framed by the explanan-
dum phenomenon” (Craver 2008, p. 121) and
“[t]he explanandum of a mechanistic explana-
tion is a phenomenon, typically some behavior
of a mechanism as a whole” (Craver 2008, p.
139).
In mechanistic explanation, a given X is a
component of the mechanism M if and only if it
is one of the entities organized such that S ex-
hibits some phenomenon . So the engine, theψ
accelerator, and the gas tank, but not the mud-
flaps or the windshield wipers are components
of  M that  explain  the  car  accelerating,  even
though these are  all parts of the car  S. In an
1 There is a terminological issue that needs to be raised at the outset to
avoid confusion. Craver & Bechtel (2007; Craver 2008) usually, but not
always, use S to refer to a mechanism. In contrast, I will always use S to
refer to the system or entity exhibiting the explanandum phenomenon ,ψ
and I introduce the symbol M to refer to the responsible mechanism. I
do this because M and S are clearly not identical. Moreover, they are (or
at least appear to me) to be distinguished in this passage, at least on one
reading. I think it is unfortunate that neither Craver nor Bechtel form-
ally and consistently distinguish the system S and the mechanism M in
their analysis, for reasons that will become clear at the end of this sec-
tion. Here I’ll attempt to faithfully capture the essence of the Craver–
Bechtel mechanistic framework, were it to have included this important
distinction.
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ideal explanation, the mechanism defined by the
parts {X} will contain all and only the compon-
ents relevant to S -ingψ  (see Craver 2008 for a
discussion of constitutive relevance in this con-
text). To identify the parts of M is thus to spe-
cify  both a  hierarchical  and a functional  rela-
tionship between M and its parts, and between
M and S. 
But although mechanistic explanation in-
volves  essential  reference  to  hierarchical  rela-
tionships  between  levels  of  organization,  it  is
not thereby a species of  reductive  explanation
because  in  a  successful  systems  explanation
nothing  is  rendered  inessential  or  redundant.
The phenomenon  is neither ψ derived nor deriv-
able from laws governing the parts of M; rather,
the parts {X} and their relationships simply are
M, and together explain why S s. The explanψ -
atory relationship is not rational derivation, but
functional  composition:  M is  physically  and
functionally  constituted by its parts, and  S sψ
in virtue of that constitution.
Mechanistic  explanations  are  constitutive
or componential explanations: they explain
the behavior of the mechanism as a whole
in terms of the organized activities and in-
teractions of its components. Components
are the entities in a mechanism—what are
commonly called ‘parts’. (Craver 2008, p.
128)2
Given all this we can add one more criterion
for a given  X being a part of the mechanism
M: each  X must be not just a functional but
also a  spatial sub-part of  M. As a component
of  M,  X will be at a  lower level than M, and
smaller  than M:  “[b]ecause  mechanisms  are
collections of components and their activities,
no component can be larger than the mechan-
ism as a whole,  and so levels of mechanisms
are ordered by size” (Craver &  Bechtel 2007,
pp.  549–550).  Craver  and  Bechtel  conclude:
“[m]ost  fundamentally,  levels  of  mechanisms
are a species of compositional, or part-whole
relations” (Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 550). In
the  overall  framework  developed  by  Craver
2 Note  that  within  this  framework  “componential  mechanism”,  “con-
stitutive mechanism”, and “compositional mechanism” are synonymous.
and  Bechtel,  functional  levels  and  spatial
levels generally align. 
Thus,  although componential  mechanistic
explanations  are  not  reductive,  they generally
are what one would call “bottom-up”, or per-
haps  better  in  this  context,  “level-restricted”:
one explains the phenomenon  in  ψ S by refer-
ence to entities and relations at a lower level of
organization, but never the reverse. In compon-
ential  explanations  of  this  sort,  the  intrinsic
properties  of  and  interactions  between  the
mechanism’s components account for a system’s
actions  (where  “intrinsic”  means  that  such
properties—such as the charge of  an ion—are
either basic to the entity or accounted for by
reference  to  entities  and  properties  at  a  still
lower level of organization). Good mechanistic
explanations on this view will not include refer-
ences to unanalyzed properties of the whole  S
or M, its “shape” or overall organization, as the
relations between the components {X} at  the
lower level will already account for (in fact con-
stitute) these. 
This  account  of  mechanistic  explanation
seems  to  me  a  clear  and,  indeed,  compelling
model of one kind of explanatory practice in the
neurosciences. To satisfy the norms of mechan-
istic explanation, one must:
 
1. Identify the phenomenon of interest ψ
2. Identify the system S that sψ
3. Identify the relevant spatial sub-parts {X} of
M (and their relevant intrinsic properties) 
4. Describe  how  the  parts  {X}  are  organized
such that S s ψ
At least  prima facie, a number of instances of
successful (albeit incomplete) explanatory mod-
els in the neurosciences appear to neatly fit this
description.  Craver (2008) extensively discusses
the mechanistic model of the action potential.
Briefly, following the steps above: 
1. The phenomenon  is  the action potential,ψ
which consists of the rapid depolarization of
neural cells from a resting membrane poten-
tial of approximately –70mV toward (and in
many cases significantly exceeding) 0mV; an
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equally rapid repolarization; a period of hy-
perpolarization, where the cell overshoots the
normal resting potential;  and a gradual re-
turn to the resting equilibrium (note that as
even this simplified sketch illustrates,  willψ
often be in and of itself complex, with many
aspects that any adequate model must cap-
ture). 
2. The system S that s is the neuron. ψ
3. The parts in virtue of which S s include eleψ -
ments of  the cell  and its surrounding ionic
milieu: positively charged K+ and Na+ ions;
gated,  ion-specific  membrane  channels;  and
the Na+/K+ pump. 
4. Finally, the organization that explains  inψ -
cludes the following: The resting potential
is  in  fact  an equilibrium between two op-
posing  forces:  a  chemical  concentration
gradient that pushes Na+ into the cell and
K+  out  of  it,  and  an  electrical  gradient
that  pushes  K+ into  the  cell,  each  main-
tained by the selective permeability of the
cell to Na+ and K+. Na+ channels change
their  conformation  in  response  to  current
flow (they are voltage-gated) such that they
open to allow Na+ to flow into the cell. As
Na+  flows  into  the  cell  this  reduces  the
electrostatic  pressure  on  K+,  and  opens
voltage-gated K+ channels, allowing K+ to
flow  out  of  the  cell.  The  net  effect  is  to
push  the  cell  initially  toward  the  electro-
chemical  balance  point  for  Na+,  which  is
about +55mV. However,  as  the membrane
potential  drops,  the  Na+  channels  close,
thus  slowing  and  eventually  stopping  the
depolarization. The diffusion of K+ out of
the cell  combines  with the activity of  the
Na+/K+ pump to repolarize the cell, which
however  overshoots  the  resting  potential
due to the fact that the K+ channels close
later than the Na+ channels, thus allowing
K+ to diffuse out of the cell  for an extra
millisecond  or  so  during  which  the  cell  is
hyper-polarized. 
Obviously,  this  remains  a  sketch  (see  Craver
2008)  or  any  basic  neuroscience  textbook  for
more detail), but it illustrates the main elements
of a mechanistic explanation. The intrinsic prop-
erties,  actions,  and  interactions  of  M’s  spatial
sub-parts together comprise the mechanism that
allows  S to  and thus explain how S s. Oneψ ψ
can likewise plausibly sketch the mechanisms that
account for spatial long-term memory (e.g., the
ability of an animal to return to some location in
its environment) in terms of long-term potenti-
ation  of  synapses  in  the  hippocampus  (Craver
2008), although it is worth noting that a more
complete account of the functions of hippocampus
will have some of the features I describe in 3 and
4 (Buckner 2010;  Anderson 2015). Still, the fact
that  some explanations in neuroscience are like
this is not under significant dispute. 
But this brings us to the question of why
I  have  distinguished  M and  S in  my  treat-
ment.  Because  Craver (2008) does not form-
ally distinguish these,  he is  never led to ask
what the precise relationship is (or could be)
between M and S (and between their respect-
ive  parts).  In  fact,  for  Craver  the  symbol  S
usually (but not always) refers to what I have
been calling  M, and he frames his analysis of
mechanistic composition entirely in terms of ψ
and its mechanism. When he does mention the
larger system it is generally to emphasize the
fact that not every part of a system S is relev-
ant to the mechanism in virtue of which it s.ψ
So what might the committed mechanist say
about  the  relationships  between  S,  M and
{X}? One possibility is: all the parts {X} of
M will be on a lower level than S. That would
be in keeping with the level-restricted charac-
ter  of  the  framework,  and  its  characteristic
alignment  between  spatial  and  functional
levels.  It is certainly a feature of all  the ex-
amples discussed in its support, including the
model of the action potential outlined above.
A  slightly  stronger  possibility  would  be:  all
the parts {X} of M will be spatial sub-parts of
S.  I  don’t  think anyone would or should en-
dorse this stronger condition, but seeing why
will  be  instructive,  and  will  lead  us  to  the
reasons  to  reject  the  weaker  formulation  as
well.3 
3 On my reading, the framework developed in (Craver 2008) implicitly as-
sumes the weaker condition, although most likely not the stronger one.
But for my purposes here it is not crucial to pin this down. If the frame-
work does assume the weaker condition, what follows should be read as
arguing (contra this model) that there are systems for which functional
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The immediate trouble with the stronger
formulation  is  that  it  collides  with  a  fact
noted by Craver (2008), but not otherwise dis-
cussed: the mechanism that accounts for S -ψ
ing may contain parts that are extrinsic to  S
(although  not  to  M).  For  instance,  in  the
mechanism for  the action potential,  the Na+
and K+ ions that are clearly part of M are (at
least sometimes) extrinsic to S; and in embod-
ied accounts of  some cognitive processes like
mathematics, the mechanism that accounts for
a  person  (P)  multiplying  (ψm-ing)  contains
parts that are  always  extrinsic to  P,  such as
pencil  and  paper  (Clark 1997;  see  also  this
collection). These entities would arguably not
be  components  of  the  systems  that  ,  alψ -
though  they  would  be  components  of  the
mechanisms in virtue of which they . At theψ
very least, this suggests there are some details
yet  to  be  worked  out  about  the  necessary
physical  relationships between  M and  S that
implement the hierarchical and functional re-
lationships in virtue of which  M can account
for  S -ing. There will be (presumably rare)ψ
cases  in  which  M and  S are  identical;  cases
such as the accelerating car where M contains
only parts of  S; and cases such as the action
potential  where  M and  S cross-cut  one  an-
other, sharing some but not all of their parts.4
There may also turn out to be cases in which
they share no parts, perhaps because the parts
of  M and the parts of  S are individuated by
different criteria, or because S’s ability to  isψ
imposed by or inherited from an entirely ex-
trinsic mechanism (indeed I’ll discuss a poten-
tial instance of this class of cases later in the
paper). 
But distinguishing  M and S in this way
also allows one to ask whether all the parts of
M need to be at a lower level than  S. If not
and spatial levels in fact dissociate. If it does not, then what follows
should be read simply as offering an account of some of the possible
functional relationships between mechanisms and systems, an issue not
explored in the original analysis. Either path leads to the same recom-
mended modification of the original model.
4 In the case of the action potential, one  might mount the argument
that the system that s is ψ strictly speaking S + {the nominally non-
S parts of  M}, including the surrounding extracellular fluid. That
would make M part of S in this case, but it is not clear to me that
this move will be equally attractive in every such case, nor do I think
the mechanist is forced to adopt this strategy.
every  X needs to be a spatial sub-part of  S,
then there is little reason to suppose that each
X needs to be on a lower level than S, either.
Indeed, I claim that in fact for some systems
S the  mechanism  M will  contain  items  that
are  neither  intrinsic  to  nor  at  a  lower  level
than S. For instance, I often use other people
to  help  me  remember  things,  in  the  easiest
case by asking them to remind me at some fu-
ture time. In such a case, this other individual
is arguably part of the mechanism responsible
for my remembering, but is certainly not for
that reason on a lower ontological level than I
am, qua remembering system. Moreover, as I
will argue when looking at the case discussed
below, some relevant parts of M (and certainly
M itself) are at a  higher  organizational level
than  S.  Now  of  course,  Craver  &  Bechtel
define the concept of  lower level in terms of
being a part of the mechanism: “an item X is
at a lower level than an item S if and only if
X is a component in the mechanism for some
activity  of  ψ S” (2007, p. 548). I agree that
this  holds  for  the  constitutive  relationship
between  mechanisms and their  parts.  But  it
only holds for all systems S if we assume that
all the parts of M are parts of S, and we have
seen that this is not always the case. Thus al-
though I think that Craver correctly analyzes
the  relationship  between  mechanisms  and
their  parts  in  terms of  constitution,  I  argue
that  the  more  capacious  notion  of  enabling
constraint better  captures  the  relationship
between  mechanisms  and  the  systems  whose
activities they enable. 
In any case,  with this as background, I
now turn to the case of the SAC. In  3, I de-
scribe what we know about how the mechan-
isms in virtue of which the cell operates, and
in 4 I discuss the implications of this case for
componential mechanistic explanation.
3 Direction selectivity in SAC dendrites: 
Beyond componential constitution 
Starburst Amacrine Cells are axonless neurons
found in the retina of mammals and numerous
non-mammalian species.  Their morphology is
planar, with multiple dendrites arrayed, as the
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name suggests, in a starburst pattern around
the cell body (Figure 1). 
SACs form dense, highly overlapping, co-
fasciculating layers in the “on” and “off” levels
of the inner synaptic layer of the retina, nestled
physically and functionally between bipolar cells
and  direction-selective  ganglion  cells.  Among
the  most  numerous  neural  cells  found  in  the
mammalian retina, they represent a large pro-
portion of the total neural volume in the eye; in
the rabbit retina, for example, as much as six
meters  of  SAC  dendrites  occupy  each  square
millimeter  of  retinal  surface—higher  coverage
than any other retinal cell by an order of mag-
nitude (Masland 2005; Tauchi & Masland 1984;
see Figure 2).
SACs  are  interesting  for  multiple  reas-
ons.  Despite  lacking  axons,  they  synthesize
and  release  both  excitatory  and  inhibitory
neurotransmitters  (ACh  (acetylcholine)  and
GABA (-Aminobutyric acid)) from the distal
regions of their  dendrites. Both the role and
relative proportion of  excitatory and inhibit-
ory  synaptic  connections  change  over  time.
Cholinergic  synaptic  connections  between
neighboring  SACs  disappear  over  develop-
ment,  and  GABAergic  connections  between
SACs begin as excitatory but later become in-
hibitory. However, excitatory cholinergic syn-
apses between SACs and ganglion cells remain
(Masland 2005). 
Functionally, SACs play an important role
in motion detection, and are part of the overall
network for multiple uses including optokinetic
eye movement and motion perception (Yoshida
et al. 2001). In fact, each dendrite of the SAC
acts independently of the others, and signals the
presence of stimuli moving centrifugally, that is,
from the cell body out in the direction of the
signaling dendrite (Euler et al. 2002; see Figure
3). Put differently, each SAC dendrite is a direc-
tionally selective spatial sub-part of the overall
cell, and this is the functional property that will
interest us here. As with so much in the neuros-
ciences, the mechanism that explains this func-
tion is complex and not fully understood. It is,
however, possible to offer a sketch of it. 
As mentioned above, SACs lie between bi-
polar cells and direction-selective ganglion cells.
Bipolar cells  thus mediate the initial  stimulus
such that a moving light causes them to fire in
turn as the stimulus moves across  the retina.
The bipolar cells make excitatory synapses onto
the SAC dendrites.5 With these basic anatom-
ical  facts  in  view,  we  can  turn  to  describing
5 In fact there are two classes of bipolar cells, “on” and “off”, function-
ally differentiated by their disposition to respond to stimulus onset
vs. stimulus offset—i.e., one responds to light and the other to dark
—and anatomically distinguished by whether they synapse onto the
“on” or “off”  level of the inner synaptic layer (Figure  4). As the
mechanisms for direction selectivity in SAC dendrites are the same
regardless, I’ll ignore this detail in what follows.
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Figure 1: Micrograph of a Starburst Amacrine Cell. Cal-
ibration  bar  50µm.  Reprinted  from  Tauchi &  Masland
(1984).
Figure  2:  Depiction of the SAC network in peripheral
retina. Calibration bar 50µm. Reprinted from  Tauchi &
Masland (1984).
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three different aspects of the overall mechanism
for  direction  selectivity:  wiring  specificity
between  bipolar  cells  and the  SAC dendrites;
lateral  inhibition  between  neighboring  SACs;
and active elements in the dendrites themselves.
First, the axonal projections of bipolar cells
largely preserve the topography of their inputs,
such that neighboring axons come from cells with
neighboring  inputs,  and make neighboring syn-
apses onto post-synaptic cells. What this arrange-
ment means for SACs is that neighboring syn-
apses  on the  dendrite  are  likely  to  come from
neighboring bipolar cells, so that when a moving
stimulus activates one cell, and then another im-
mediately to its left (say), this will tend to activ-
ate a given synapse, and then another immedi-
ately to its  left. Thus, in the case where such a
stimulus moves along the direction of a dendritic
process, the successive excitatory inputs to that
dendrite will tend to reinforce (Demb 2007; Lee &
Zhou 2006).  This  is  an  important  part  of  the
overall mechanism, but is not sufficient by itself
to produce the observed directional selectivity, as
these inputs would tend to reinforce even during
centripetal motion, although this would result in
a weaker response  at  the  distal  process  of  the
dendrite (Hausselt et al. 2007).
Another important part of the mechanism
for directional selectivity involves mutual inhibi-
tion between neighboring SACs (Figure 5). As a
stimulus moves so as to stimulate the centrifu-
gal dendrite of SAC1 (in Figure 5A), reinforcing
inputs will cause the release of GABA onto the
centripetal  dendrite  of  SAC0,  such  that  even
when the light stimuli begins to excite the cent-
ripetal dendrite of SAC0, the leading inhibition
dominates the signal. Similarly, as the stimulus
moves to the centrifugal  dendrite of SAC0, the
successive  excitatory  inputs  from  the  bipolar
cells reinforce, and any inhibitory inputs from
the neighboring SAC2 come too late. Moreover,
SAC0 will largely inhibit SAC2’s response (Fig-
ure  5B;  Lee &  Zhou 2006). An important ele-
ment  of  this  mechanism  involves  the  relative
time-course of ACh and GABA: ACh response
from  the  bipolar  cells  ramps  up  and  decays
fairly  quickly,  while  GABA response  is  relat-
ively delayed and prolonged (Demb 2007). This
temporal asymmetry helps ensure that when in-
hibition leads it dominates, and vice-versa. The
distance between SACs also plays a role. The
likelihood of synaptic connections between the
distal portion of the dendrites of two SACs—
where inhibitory connections are most effective
—depends on the distance between the cell bod-
ies. Cells that are very close together or very far
apart will thus not mutually inhibit one another
(Figure 5C). 
Finally, direction selectivity depends upon
properties of the dendrite itself. The dendrites
are electrically isolated from one another, as a
result of both overall cell morphology and the
low impedance of the cell body. The uneven dis-
tribution  of  synaptic  inputs  and  outputs  also
contributes: excitatory inputs from the bipolar
cells  are  distributed  along  the  length  of  the
dendrite, but synaptic outputs are confined to
the distal ends (as implied by the two aspects of
the  overall  mechanism  described  above).  A
third, active aspect of the local dendritic por-
tion  of  the  mechanism  appears  to  involve
voltage-gated calcium channels. These channels
lead to amplification of the ACh response bey-
ond what the passive reinforcement caused by
successive  synaptic  transmission  from  bipolar
cells can account for (Hausselt et al. 2007).
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Figure 3: Depiction of direction selectivity in SAC dend-
rites. Reprinted from Masland (2005).
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All of these elements combine to produce
the  direction  selectivity  of  the  SAC dendrite.
Bipolar  cells  successively  synapse  onto  the
dendritic process, resulting in passive reinforce-
ment of excitatory input that preferentially pro-
motes  neurotransmitter  release  in  response  to
motion in the centrifugal direction. Surrounding
SACs selectively  inhibit  centripetal  excitation,
as a result of the different temporal activation
profiles of GABA and ACh; the asymmetric dis-
tribution of input and output synapses; and the
relative  spatial  placement  of  the  SACs.  And
voltage-gated calcium channels in the dendrite
actively amplify the centrifugal signal. Although
this sketch leaves out many of the known de-
tails, and there remain many details still to be
worked out, I believe it is sufficient to warrant
the conclusion that  this  is  (a)  an instance of
mechanistic explanation that (b) does not have
the level-restricted character of the (canonical)
mechanistic explanations laid out above. I spell
out the reasons for this conclusion in the next
section.
4 Constitution and constraint 
We can most readily see why this case repres-
ents  an interesting challenge for  componential
mechanism by fitting it to the four steps out-
lined in section 2, above.
1. Identify the phenomenon of interest ψ
2. Identify the system S that sψ
3. Identify the relevant spatial sub-parts {X} of
M (and their relevant intrinsic properties)
4. Describe  how  the  parts  {X}  are  organized
such that S s ψ
The specific phenomenon of interest ψds is direc-
tion selectivity or, more precisely, the release of
neurotransmitter in and only in response to mo-
tion in a specific centrifugal direction. The sys-
tem Sds that exhibits ψds is the dendrite of the
SAC. It is also easy to say what the parts {Xds}
of the mechanism Mds are in virtue of which the
dendrite  ψ-dss,  and how they are  organized.  I
have  provided  that  sketch  above.  Finally,  it
seems right to say, following Craver (2008), that
the relationship between Mds and its parts {Xds}
is one of componential constitution, such that
all the parts {Xds} are at a lower level than Mds,
and together constitute Mds. But now it gets in-
teresting for componential mechanistic explana-
tion as currently developed. For only some of
the  parts  of  Mds—including  the  voltage  gated
calcium  channels,  and  the  input  and  output
synapses—are at a lower (spatial) level than the
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Figure 4: Schematic representation of the layered struc-
ture and synaptic relationships between bipolar cells and
SACs. Reprinted from Yoshida et al. (2001).
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dendrite  Sds. The  inhibitory  dendrites  of  the
neighboring SACs are at the same level as  Sds,
the bipolar cells and their spatial relations are
arguably at a higher level than Sds (although one
might wish to screen these off as mere inputs to
the  mechanism),  and  the  mechanism  M as  a
whole in virtue of which Sds ψ-dss is certainly at
a higher level than, and is in no way a physical
or functional component of Sds.
I  think  this  example  demonstrates  that
not every mechanistic explanation will have the
“bottom-up” or “level-restricted” character that
the  mechanism  for  the  action  potential  has,
where function is built entirely from the capa-
cities of lower-level components and their inter-
actions. In the SAC dendrite, we appear to have
a case not of a system that s in virtue of theψ
capacities and relations of its components (and
that could in turn be thought of as a compon-
ent supporting the activities  of  a larger  func-
tional system), but rather very nearly the re-
verse: a system that s in virtue of the properψ -
ties of and interactions in the higher-level sys-
tem of  which  it  is  a  part.  That  is,  the SAC
dendrite is  not functionally related to its sur-
rounds as a component to a higher-level system;
nor  is  the  higher-level  system  related  to  the
SAC dendrite as one of its components. Instead,
I want to say that the higher-level mechanism
M acts as an enabling constraint on S.
Before providing a bit more in the way of
substantial  analysis  of  the  concept  of  an  en-
abling constraint, let us pause to consider one
way  in  which  a  supporter  of  componential
mechanistic  explanation might  resist  this  con-
clusion by redefining the system  Sds to include
the mechanism Mds. I think this is not a viable
option for a number of reasons. First, it would
appear to violate standard usage: neuroscient-
ists  speak of  direction-selective  dendrites,  and
not of a directionally selective network spanning
several retinal layers. The debate in the neuros-
cientific literature concerns not the definition of
the direction-selective system, but the relative
role  of  intrinsic  and extrinsic  mechanisms  for
dendritic direction selectivity in SACs (Hausselt
et al. 2007; Lee & Zhou 2006). 
Second, it appears that the mechanism as
a  whole  is  not direction  selective.  Any  given
SAC, for instance, and certainly the network as
a whole, signals motion in all directions. Even if
we restrict the definition of  Mds to the entities
in virtue of which one particular SAC dendrite
is  directionally selective,  the symmetry of  the
mechanism—the fact that SACs  mutually con-
strain one another and the same bipolar cells
synapse  onto  more  than  one  SAC dendrite—
strongly  suggests  that  very  same  mechanism
generates right direction selectivity in the right-
ward-reaching dendrite in SAC0, and left direc-
tion selectivity in the leftward-reaching dendrite
in  SAC2 (e.g.,  in  Figure  4).  The mechanism,
that  is,  does not  have the  same direction se-
lectivity as either of the dendrites. Rather, it’s
as if when you turn the crank one way (i.e., the
stimulus moves one way) the mechanism pro-
duces  one  output;  and  when you turn  it  the
other way, it produces the other output.
This suggests a different way to illustrate
the limitations  of  componential  mechanism as
formulated.  Craver  writes  that  the  explanan-
dum phenomenon  is “typically some behaviorψ
of the mechanism as a whole” (Craver 2008, p.
139), and he thus might insist, contra my way
of formulating his framework in 2, that it is the
mechanism M and not the system S that exhib-
its . In this case, because I have agreed thatψ
the parts {X} in fact constitute M, any conflict
between  functional  and  spatial  levels  disap-
pears. But in the case before us it seems that
the  mechanism  responsible for,  say,  rightward
direction  selectivity  does  not  in  fact  exhibit
rightward direction selectivity. So the functional
puzzle reasserts itself in a different guise.6 
One  might  nevertheless  insist  on  distin-
guishing these mechanisms in subtle ways—per-
haps  Mds0 includes these synapses from bipolar
cells, but not those synapses, while Mds2 includes
those synapses but not these. I doubt whether
this can work, because explaining direction se-
lectivity in either direction will require reference
to  the  excitatory inputs  from bipolar  cells  to
the centrifugal dendrite, and the inhibitory in-
puts from the overlapping centripetal dendrite,
which are in turn a result of the excitatory in-
puts from the very same bipolar cells synapsing
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this way of ex-
pressing the matter.
Anderson, M. L. (2015). Beyond Componential Constitution in the Brain - Starburst Amacrine Cells and Enabling Constraints.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 1(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570429 9 | 13
www.open-mind.net
onto the centrifugal  dendrite.  But let  us take
the  possibility  as  granted.  Then  one  seems
forced  to  say  something  along  the  following
lines: the mechanism as a whole s, but ψ signals
-ing with the dendrite.ψ
Let  us  consider  this  possibility  carefully.
As I intimated above, scientists debate the rel-
ative  importance  of  intrinsic  and  extrinsic
mechanisms  for  dendritic  selectivity  in  SACs.
Hausselt et al. (2007)  note  that  direction  se-
lectivity in SAC dendrites persists in the pres-
ence of GABA and glycene receptor antagonists,
which would deactivate the portions of the nor-
mal mechanism that involve mutual inhibition
between  neighboring  SACs.  In  these  circum-
stances, one might argue that only the portions
of the original mechanism intrinsic to the dend-
rite  matter  in the explanation of  direction-se-
lectivity,  and in  such a  case  it  is  clearly  the
dendrite that s. What shall we say, then, whenψ
we remove the antagonists from the system and
reapply the same directional stimulus, resulting
in neurotransmitter release from this dendrite?
One option is: whereas before the dendrite ’d,ψ
now it  merely signals  the -ing of  the largerψ
mechanism. But it seems clear to me that, if the
dendrite  can ,  then  adding network interacψ -
tions that  aid and enhance (that is, do not in
any sense prevent) -ing can hardly cause it toψ
not ,  but  only  signal  .  This  points  to  aψ ψ
fourth  and  final  reason  to  reject  the  general
move to extend the neural system S to include
the mechanism  M whenever it  is  (or contains
entities that are) on a higher level than S: one
would apparently need the ability to rigorously
distinguish between -ing and ψ signaling  in anψ
overall system where to  is generally also toψ
signal it—that is, where signaling and doing are
deeply intertwined. Thus, I believe we must in-
sist: the dendrite s.ψ
For all these reasons, I do not think it is
wise to hold onto level-restricted explanations
and componential composition by fiat. Instead,
it is  time to expand the scope of mechanistic
explanation by considering the various ways in
which systems  S relate to the  mechanisms  M
that enable their activities. I think the case of
SACs is  especially  important  because  it  illus-
trates one way in which local selectivity in parts
of a network can be the result of the interplay
of  excitation  and  mutual  inhibition  between
non-selective  parts  of  that  network,  which  is
clearly something that we need to understand
better if we are to accurately characterize the
functional  mechanisms  at  work  in  both  small
and large-scale brain networks (Anderson et al.
2013).  But  other  structure-function  relation-
ships appear to call equally for a broader ac-
count of mechanistic explanation. For instance,
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Figure 5: Lateral inhibition between neighbouring SACs
contributes to direction selectivity in the dendrites. Re-
printed from Lee & Zhou (2006). 
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the direction-selective ganglion cell DSGC (Dir-
ection-Selective  Ganglion  Cell),  mentioned
briefly above, responds to stimuli moving only
in its preferred direction (which of course varies
cell-to-cell). In this case, there do not appear to
be any intrinsic mechanisms for the direction se-
lectivity of the DSGC. Rather, SAC dendrites
selectively synapse onto DSCGs with preferred
stimuli antiparallel to the SAC dendrite prefer-
ence  (Briggman 2011)  thus  suppressing  re-
sponses  to  motion  in  the  non-preferred  direc-
tion.  DSCGs seem to  simply  inherit their  se-
lectivity via their synaptic contact with SACs—
and, in fact, elimination of SACs from the ret-
ina  abolishes  direction  selectivity  in  DSCGs
(Yoshida et al. 2001). Here I just don’t see any
case  for  a  compositional  relationship  between
the mechanism (or its parts) and the selective
system.  Instead,  the  relevant  mechanism syn-
apses  onto  the  relevant  system,  and  by  sup-
pressing a sub-set of its response tendencies, in-
duces selectivity.
This brings us finally back to the notion of
“constraint”, which I think may help us under-
stand the full range of mechanism/system rela-
tionships in the brain. The term constraint has
been used in myriad ways in the literature on
scientific  explanation.  In  evolutionary  biology,
scientists  refer  for  instance  to  stability  con-
straints (Schlosser 2007) and both universal and
local  developmental  constraints on evolvability
(Maynard Smith et  al. 1985).  There  are  also
law-like  constraints  on  the  possible  states  of
physical systems generally (Lange 2011). None
of these capture the sense of “constraint” that
will be most helpful to us here.
One notion that gets us close is the idea
of a “capacity constraint”, that is, a limitation
on the capacity of a process that might take
the form of changing the relative probabilities
of  the  range  of  possible  process  outcomes
(Sansom 2009).  This  certainly  has  the  right
flavor, for in the mechanism under discussion
above it  appears  that the excitatory and in-
hibitory interactions between bipolar cells and
neighboring  SACs  bias  the  outcome  of  the
dendritic  processing  of  the  moving  stimulus.
But insofar as a capacity constraint is gener-
ally conceptualized in terms of the reduction
of  some  pre-existing  whole  ability—in
Sansom’s  (2009)  example,  being  handcuffed
limits one’s ability to move one’s hands—this
does not offer quite the right organizing frame
for explanation in neuroscience. 
The reason is  that  in the neurosciences
we want to understand not just the capacities
of entities, but how the structured interactions
between entities give rise to  functions, which
are,  crucially,  differential  and  differentiating
processes  (that  is,  they  differ  from  one  an-
other, and they differentiate between stimuli).
Capacities in the sense of general powers (the
capacity to generate an action potential, say)
are  necessary  conditions  for  functions,  but
they  are  not  yet  functions;  the  DSGC  is
strictly speaking non-functional in the absence
of SACs, even though it will continue to exer-
cise its capacity to fire action potentials in re-
sponse  to  inputs  from  bipolar  cells.  Con-
straints  of  the  sort  under  investigation  here
serve to limit capacities, but in so doing they
enable  functions;  they  result  in  an  enhance-
ment (not a reduction) of the abilities of the
system (and the organism).
For this reason I propose to analyze the
general functional (and, crucially,  non-hierarch-
ical) relationship between mechanisms and sys-
tems  in  the  following  way:  an  enabling  con-
straint is a relationship between entities and/or
mechanisms at a particular level of description
and a functional system at the same or a differ-
ent  level,  such  that  the  entities/mechanisms
bias (i.e.,  change the relative probabilities  of)
the outcomes of processing by the system. Such
enabling constraints offer necessary but not suf-
ficient conditions for the instantiation of differ-
ential  function in neural systems. Because en-
abling  constraints  are  synchronic  rather  than
diachronic, the idea shares the same explanat-
ory advantage that the relation of constitution
has over the relation of “causation” (when un-
derstood, e.g., as an event involving the trans-
mission of some property, power, or conserved
quantity from one entity to another). As Craver
&  Bechtel (2007) point out, such a conception
of  causation  does  not  accomodate  interlevel
functional relationships well, because these are
often synchronic and symmetric, whereas causa-
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tion of this sort is temporal and asymmetric.7 In
addition,  enabling  constraints  can  be  mutual,
which  gives  the  idea  an  advantage  over  both
causation  and  constitution  as  an  analysis  of
functional relationships in the brain. 
Enabling  constraint  =Df A  physical  rela-
tionship  between  a  functional  system  S
and entities {X} (and/or mechanism M),
at the same or different level of descrip-
tion, such  that {X} (and/or M) changes
the  relative  probabilities  of  various  pos-
sible functional outcomes of activity in S.
To understand function not just in systems like
SAC  dendrites  and  DSGCs,  but  also  in  the
large  scale  networks  that  are  partially  consti-
tuted  by  the  Transiently  Assembled  Local
Neural  Subsystems  TALoNS  (Transiently  As-
sembled  Local  Neural  Subsystems)  crucial  to
the functioning of a dynamic brain (Anderson
2015), we need to accept that there is a broader
range of relationships that mechanisms can have
to  functional  systems,  beyond  componential
constitution.  Function  in  TALoNS results  not
from  structured  interactions  between  stable,
autonomous  low-level  components,  but  rather
from  the  interplay  between  the  capacities  of
lower-level entities and higher-level network dy-
namics. That interplay, I argue, is best analyzed
in  terms of  the  mutual  constraint  that  exists
between bottom-up and top-down, feed-forward
and feed-back mechanisms in the brain. 
5 Conclusion
Although mechanistic explanation as developed
by  Craver &  Bechtel (2007;  Craver 2008) does
seem to accurately characterize one kind of ex-
planation in neuroscience, and one kind of func-
7 For instance, what explains why a neuron has a particular functional
property  cannot  be  an  event  involving  the  transmission  of  some
property, power or conserved quantity from the parts of the neuron
to the whole, because if causes must precede their effects, this would
appear require that there be a time prior to which the neuron did
not have the functional property conferred by its parts. Interlevel
functional relationships do not generally appear to be temporal in
this way.  Rather, for Craver and Bechtel, what explains the func-
tional property of the neuron is the way it is constituted by its parts.
Enabling constraints are also synchronic in the relevant way, and so
the view I am advocating here is  also able to accommodate such
cases of interlevel functional relationships.
tional arrangement in neural systems, I’ve ar-
gued  here  that  the  formulation  is  not  wide
enough to capture the variety of mechanisms in
the  brain.  When  we  formally  distinguish  the
system S from the mechanism  M in virtue of
which S exhibits the explanandum phenomenon
, we see that although it seems correct to deψ -
scribe the relationship between M and its parts
{X} in terms of constitution, it will only some-
times be the case that  S  is (partially) consti-
tuted by {X}.
As  an  alternative  to  the  relationship  of
componential  constitution,  I  have  offered  the
notion of an  enabling constraint that can exist
between a system and the mechanism(s) in vir-
tue of which it has its various functions. SAC
dendrites appear to have their function in virtue
of the enabling constraints imposed by entities
at the same and higher levels of organization;
and  DSGC  function  is  enabled  by  the  con-
straints  imposed  by  the  SAC  dendrites.  In
neither case is it appropriate to describe the re-
lationship between the mechanism M and the
relevant system S in terms of constitution, nor
are all (or, in the case of DSGCs arguably any)
of the parts {X} of M components of S.
Overall, I hope to have made the case that
moving beyond level-restricted mechanistic ex-
planation  will  allow  us  to  better  capture  the
variety of neural systems that emerge from the
constant,  constraining,  biasing  interplay
between feed-forward, feedback, bottom-up, and
top-down processes in the dynamic brain.
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